[BRLY-2022-029] The stack buffer overflow vulnerability leads to arbitrary code execution during DXE phase.

January 9, 2023

Summary

BINARLY efiXplorer team has discovered a stack buffer overflow vulnerability that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code.

Vulnerability Information

  • BINARLY internal vulnerability identifier: BRLY-2022-029
  • Qualcomm PSIRT assigned CVE identifier: CVE-2022-40516
  • CVSS v3.1 Score 8.2 High AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Lenovo firmwares with confirmed impact by Binarly team

Fimware Module name Module SHA256 File GUID
N3HET53W/$0AN3H00.FL1 QcomChargerDxeWp a204423a940a7f0fcac05cbfda35a7e91b4459a6531002f9e6ab5603fe1452c9 2f0e56b0-3921-4133-9bb8-46f99889d046

Potential impact

An attacker with local privileged access can exploit this vulnerability to elevate privileges from ring 3 or ring 0 (depends on the operating system) to a DXE driver and execute arbitrary code.A malicious code installed as a result of the vulnerability exploitation in a DXE driver could survive across an operating system (OS) boot process and runtime or modify NVRAM area on SPI flash storage (to gain persistence on target platform).Additionally, this vulnerability potentially could be used by threat actors to bypass OS security mechanisms (modify privileged memory or runtime variables), influence on the OS boot process, and in some cases would allow an attacker to hook or modify EFI Runtime services.

Vulnerability description

The pseudocode of the vulnerable function is shown below:

__int64 sub_1ED8()
{
  __int64 DataSize;
  char Value[4];

  Value[0] = 0;
  DataSize = 1;
  if ( (gSkipFlag & 1) == 0 )
  {
    gSkipFlag = 1;
    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"DISABLEBATTERY", &MICROSOFT_VENDOR_GUID, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
      gDisableBattery = Value[0] != 0;

    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"PrintChargerAppDbgMsg", &gVariableGuid, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
      gPrintChargerAppDbgMsg = Value[0] != 0;

    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"ChargerPDLogLevel", &gVariableGuid, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
      gChargerPDLogLevel = Value[0];

    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"ChargerPDLogTimer", &gVariableGuid, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
    {
      gChargerPDLogTimer = Value[0];
      gChargerPDLogTimerFlag = Value[0] != 0;
    }

    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"ForcePowerTesting", &MICROSOFT_VENDOR_GUID, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
    {
      gForcePowerTestingValue = 2;
      gForcePowerTestingFlag = Value[0] != 0;
    }
  }
  return 0;
}

As we can see from the pseudocode, DataSize is initialized only once (before the first call to gRT->GetVariable()).

Thus, if the data size of the variable in NVRAM is greater than 1, DataSize will be overwritten. Thus, a next call to gRT-GetVariable() may cause an overflow on the stack (and subsequent execution of arbitrary code).

In order to fix this vulnerability, the DataSize variable must be initialized before each call to gRT->GetVariable():

  Value[0] = 0;
  DataSize = 1;
  if ( (gSkipFlag & 1) == 0 )
  {
    gSkipFlag = 1;
    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"DISABLEBATTERY", &MICROSOFT_VENDOR_GUID, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
      gDisableBattery = Value[0] != 0;

    DataSize = 1;
    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"PrintChargerAppDbgMsg", &gVariableGuid, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
      gPrintChargerAppDbgMsg = Value[0] != 0;

    DataSize = 1;
    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"ChargerPDLogLevel", &gVariableGuid, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
      gChargerPDLogLevel = Value[0];

    DataSize = 1;
    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"ChargerPDLogTimer", &gVariableGuid, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
    {
      gChargerPDLogTimer = Value[0];
      gChargerPDLogTimerFlag = Value[0] != 0;
    }

    DataSize = 1;
    if ( !(gRT->GetVariable)(L"ForcePowerTesting", &MICROSOFT_VENDOR_GUID, 0, &DataSize, Value) )
    {
      gForcePowerTestingValue = 2;
      gForcePowerTestingFlag = Value[0] != 0;
    }
  }
  return 0;
}

Disclosure timeline

This vulnerability is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapsed or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the vulnerability report will become visible to the public.

Disclosure Activity Date (YYYY-mm-dd)
Qualcomm PSIRT is notified 2022-10-21
Qualcomm PSIRT confirmed reported issue 2022-10-30
Qualcomm PSIRT assigned CVE number 2022-12-19
Qualcomm PSIRT provide patch release 2023-01-03
BINARLY public disclosure date 2023-01-09

Acknowledgements

BINARLY efiXplorer team

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