An attacker with local access can exploit this vulnerability to elevate privileges from ring 3 or ring 0 (depends on the operating system) to a DXE driver and execute arbitrary code. Malicious code installed as a result of this exploitation could survive operating system (OS) boot process and runtime, or modify NVRAM area on the SPI flash storage (to gain persistence). Additionally, threat actors could use this vulnerability to bypass OS security mechanisms (modify privileged memory or runtime variables), influence OS boot process, and in some cases allow an attacker to hook or modify EFI Runtime services.
Binarly REsearch Team has discovered an OOB Write vulnerability in the decode routine during BMP file processing in Phoenix firmware.
An attacker with local access can exploit this vulnerability to elevate privileges from ring 3 or ring 0 (depending on the operating system) to a DXE driver and execute arbitrary code. Malicious code installed as a result of this exploitation could survive operating system (OS) boot process and runtime, or modify NVRAM area on the SPI flash storage (to gain persistence). Additionally, threat actors could use this vulnerability to bypass OS security mechanisms (modify privileged memory or runtime variables), influence OS boot process, and in some cases allow an attacker to hook or modify EFI Runtime services.
The pseudocode of the vulnerable function is shown below:
// local variable allocation has failed, the output may be wrong!
EFI_STATUS __fastcall DbDecodeImage(BUFFER_INDICATOR *Bi, EFI_IMAGE_INPUT *ImageInput)
{
UINTN BufferSize; // rcx
BMP_COLOR_PALETTE *Palette; // r15
EFI_STATUS Status; // rsi
void *Start; // rax
void *Current; // rcx
char *Start_plus_BMP_FILE_HEADER; // rax
char *Start_plus_BufferSize; // rcx
size_t ImageSize; // rdi
__int64 BmpHeaderSize; // r12
__int64 ColorAmount; // r14
EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_BLT_PIXEL *mem; // rax
UINT16 BitsPerPixel; // cx
size_t PaletteSize; // r14 MAPDST
void *Start_plus_BmpHeaderSize; // rax
void *Start_plus_BufferSize_1; // rcx
void *ImageBuffer; // rax MAPDST
void *Start_plus_ImageOffset; // rcx
UINT32 Height; // er8
int i; // ebx
EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_BLT_PIXEL *PixelPtr; // rdi
__int64 ImageIndex; // r9
UINT32 Width; // er11
UINT32 j; // er10
unsigned __int64 offset; // rcx
EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_BLT_PIXEL v29; // eax
UINT8 v30; // al
__int64 index; // rcx
__int64 v32; // rcx
unsigned __int64 v33; // rcx
__int64 v34; // rax
unsigned __int64 v35; // rcx
__int64 BitIndex; // r12
unsigned __int64 PaletteIndex; // rdx
__int64 v38; // rax
int v39; // eax
BMP_FILE_HEADER Bfh; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-40h]
BMP_INFO_HEADER Bih; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-30h]
UINT64 ScratchedBufferSize; // [rsp+A0h] [rbp+40h] OVERLAPPED
EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_BLT_PIXEL Color; // [rsp+A0h] [rbp+40h] FORCED
BufferSize = Bi->BufferSize;
Bfh.ImageOffset = 0;
Palette = 0i64;
Bih.BitsPerPixel = 0;
Status = 0i64;
Bih.ImageSize = 0;
*(_QWORD *)&Bih.HeaderSize = 0i64;
Bih.Height = 0;
if ( BufferSize <= 0x36 )
return Status;
Start = Bi->Start;
Bi->Current = Bi->Start;
ScratchedBufferSize = sizeof(BMP_FILE_HEADER);
if ( (char *)Start + sizeof(BMP_FILE_HEADER) > (char *)Start + BufferSize )
return Status;
if ( BiReadBuffer(Bi, &Bfh, &ScratchedBufferSize, (char *)Start + sizeof(BMP_FILE_HEADER)) )
return Status;
Current = Bi->Start;
ScratchedBufferSize = sizeof(BMP_INFO_HEADER);
Start_plus_BMP_FILE_HEADER = (char *)Current + sizeof(BMP_FILE_HEADER);
Start_plus_BufferSize = (char *)Current + Bi->BufferSize;
Bi->Current = Start_plus_BMP_FILE_HEADER;
if ( Start_plus_BMP_FILE_HEADER + sizeof(BMP_INFO_HEADER) > Start_plus_BufferSize
|| BiReadBuffer(Bi, &Bih, &ScratchedBufferSize, Start_plus_BMP_FILE_HEADER + sizeof(BMP_INFO_HEADER))
|| Bfh.BmpId[0] != 'B'
|| Bfh.BmpId[1] != 'M' )
{
return Status;
}
ImageSize = Bih.ImageSize;
BmpHeaderSize = Bih.HeaderSize + sizeof(BMP_FILE_HEADER);
ColorAmount = 1 << SLOBYTE(Bih.BitsPerPixel);
ScratchedBufferSize = Bih.ImageSize;
mem = (EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_BLT_PIXEL *)malloc(4i64 * Bih.Height * Bih.Width);// Root Cause #1: integer overflow. Signed mul operation.
ImageInput->Bitmap = mem;
if ( !mem )
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
BitsPerPixel = Bih.BitsPerPixel;
ImageInput->Height = Bih.Height;
ImageInput->Width = Bih.Width;
if ( !ImageSize )
{
ImageSize = Bih.Height * ((((BitsPerPixel * (unsigned __int64)Bih.Width) >> 3) + 3) & 0xFFFFFFFC);
ScratchedBufferSize = Bih.Height * ((((BitsPerPixel * (unsigned __int64)Bih.Width) >> 3) + 3) & 0xFFFFFFFC);
}
if ( (unsigned __int16)(BitsPerPixel - 1) <= 7u )
{
PaletteSize = 4 * ColorAmount;
Palette = (BMP_COLOR_PALETTE *)malloc(PaletteSize);
if ( !Palette )
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
Start_plus_BmpHeaderSize = (char *)Bi->Start + BmpHeaderSize;
Start_plus_BufferSize_1 = (char *)Bi->Start + Bi->BufferSize;
Bi->Current = Start_plus_BmpHeaderSize;
if ( (char *)Start_plus_BmpHeaderSize + PaletteSize <= Start_plus_BufferSize_1 )
BiReadBuffer(Bi, Palette, &PaletteSize, (char *)Start_plus_BmpHeaderSize + PaletteSize);
}
ImageBuffer = malloc(ImageSize);
if ( ImageBuffer )
{
Start_plus_ImageOffset = (char *)Bi->Start + Bfh.ImageOffset;
Bi->Current = Start_plus_ImageOffset;
if ( (void *)((unsigned __int64)Start_plus_ImageOffset + ImageSize) <= (char *)Bi->Start + Bi->BufferSize )
BiReadBuffer(Bi, ImageBuffer, &ScratchedBufferSize, (char *)Start_plus_ImageOffset + ImageSize);
Height = Bih.Height;
i = 0;
PixelPtr = ImageInput->Bitmap;
ImageIndex = 0i64;
Color.Reserved = 0;
if ( !Bih.Height )
goto exit;
Width = Bih.Width;
while ( 1 )
{
j = 0;
if ( Width )
break;
LABEL_40:
if ( ImageIndex & 3 )
v39 = 4 - (ImageIndex & 3);
else
v39 = 0;
ImageIndex = (unsigned int)(v39 + ImageIndex);
if ( ++i >= Height )
goto exit;
}
while ( 1 )
{
if ( Bih.BitsPerPixel == 1 ) // 2 Color Mode
// CRASH area
{
BitIndex = 7i64;
while ( j < Width )
{
PaletteIndex = ((unsigned __int64)*((unsigned __int8 *)ImageBuffer + ImageIndex) >> BitIndex) & 1;
*(_WORD *)&Color.Green = *(_WORD *)&Palette[PaletteIndex].Green;
Color.Blue = Palette[PaletteIndex].Blue;
v38 = j++;
--BitIndex;
PixelPtr[v38 + Width * (Height - i - 1)] = Color;// OOB write Root Cause #1
Height = Bih.Height;
Width = Bih.Width;
}
--j;
ImageIndex = (unsigned int)(ImageIndex + 1);
goto LABEL_39;
}
if ( Bih.BitsPerPixel == 4 ) // 16 Color Mode
break;
switch ( Bih.BitsPerPixel )
{
case 8u: // 256 Color Mode
v32 = *((unsigned __int8 *)ImageBuffer + ImageIndex);
ImageIndex = (unsigned int)(ImageIndex + 1);
*(_WORD *)&Color.Green = *(_WORD *)&Palette[v32].Green;
v30 = Palette[v32].Blue;
LABEL_30:
index = Width * (Height - i - 1);
LABEL_33:
Color.Blue = v30;
offset = j + index;
v29 = Color;
goto LABEL_34;
case 0x18u: // 16M Color Mode
*(_WORD *)&Color.Green = *(_WORD *)((char *)ImageBuffer + ImageIndex + 1);
v30 = *((_BYTE *)ImageBuffer + ImageIndex);
ImageIndex = (unsigned int)(ImageIndex + 3);
goto LABEL_30;
case 0x20u: // CRASH case
offset = j + (unsigned __int64)(Width * (Height - i - 1));
v29 = *(EFI_GRAPHICS_OUTPUT_BLT_PIXEL *)((char *)ImageBuffer + ImageIndex);
ImageIndex = (unsigned int)(ImageIndex + 4);
LABEL_34:
PixelPtr[offset] = v29; // OOB write Root Cause #1
Height = Bih.Height;
Width = Bih.Width;
break;
}
LABEL_39:
if ( ++j >= Width )
goto LABEL_40;
}
v33 = (unsigned __int64)*((unsigned __int8 *)ImageBuffer + ImageIndex) >> 4;
*(_WORD *)&Color.Green = *(_WORD *)&Palette[v33].Green;
Color.Blue = Palette[v33].Blue;
v34 = j++;
PixelPtr[v34 + Width * (Height - i - 1)] = Color;// OOB write Root Cause #1
LOBYTE(v33) = *((_BYTE *)ImageBuffer + ImageIndex);
ImageIndex = (unsigned int)(ImageIndex + 1);
v35 = v33 & 0xF;
*(_WORD *)&Color.Green = *(_WORD *)&Palette[v35].Green;
v30 = Palette[v35].Blue;
index = Bih.Width * (Bih.Height - i - 1);
goto LABEL_33;
}
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
exit:
if ( Palette )
gEfiBootServices->FreePool(Palette);
if ( ImageBuffer )
gEfiBootServices->FreePool(ImageBuffer);
return Status;
}
As we can see from the pseudocode, Width
and Height
are not checked properly and there is a signed operation of multiply between them. This could lead to: malloc(4 * (-1 * -1))
which in turn allocates very small buffer on a heap. However bigger integers Width
and Height
treated as unsigned will allow to create and OOB index for such a buffer.
This vulnerability could lead to the execution of arbitrary code during the DXE phase.
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapsed or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug report will become visible to the public.
Binarly REsearch Team